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Abstract 
A multinomial regression is used on data from a survey of French bean smallholders to analyse duration of 
business to farm business relations in horticulture farming conditional on incentives, transaction cost 
minimization and social capital. Average marginal effects return a higher probability of short duration given a 
higher number of farmer neighbours and farms located further from the village indicating dependence on social 
networks and avoidance of competition for farm supplies. The probability of long duration is higher if farmers 
have access to credit and prior information on prices, large farm area under beans and contractual experience, if 
selected to farm beans and if a farmer knows a higher number of farmers selling to the same buyer, if a farmer 
uses a supply contract and the farm is further from the source of irrigation water. This suggests that long duration 
exchanges are based on high powered incentives, transaction cost reduction, social capital and control of quality 
supplies. It is concluded that the success of production and market intervention programs in the smallholder 
sector will require buyers to exploit social networks, use production and output incentives and build on existing 
farmer expertise. 
Keywords: contract duration; incentives; transaction costs; social capital; smallholders; Kenya  
 
1. Introduction  
Buyers of vegetable and fruits destined for Western European markets are faced by the daunting demand for 
consistency, reliability, product quality and safety standards from retailers and government import regulations. 
One coping strategy for buyers and sellers is to use business to farm business (B2B) or supplier-buyer exchange 
relations that mitigate possible failure in the distribution system. The success of an exchange relationship 
requires both parties to make concessions and undertake obligations for mutual dependability. This is more 
profound especially because trading in horticultural produce is subject to strict production and handling 
standards due to changing consumption lifestyle, nutritional considerations and public regulations in continental 
Europe and USA (European Commission, 2000; Kilmer et al. 2001). Globally, the growing demand for 
pesticide-free products, mandatory process standards, traceability and labeling of products, and adoption of 
private standards (e.g., GlobalGAP) is changing quality and procurement environment in export markets thus 
posing enormous financial outlay and expertise constraints on smallholdings in Third World countries (Eom, 
1992; Lee and Hathaway, 1999; Food and Agriculture Organization, 1999; GlobalGAP, 2009; Asfwa et al. 2010). 
Smallholder farming systems raise higher concern for control due to potential health risk through pesticide 
residues and microbial contamination hazards (World Health Organization, 1998; European Commission, 2000; 
Vorley and Fox, 2004). 
For over 20 years, Kenyan smallholders have traded in horticultural exports either individually or as 
outgrowers through B2B relations under ‘arms-length’ contractual arrangements with export firms (Natural 
Resources Institute, 2002; Jaffee, 2003; Humphrey, 2005). The arms-length arrangements involve provision of 
inputs and technical assistance to smallholders in return for delivery of supplies (Dijkstra et al. 2001). However, 
export firms prefer supplies from large farms that can implement traceability though supplies from smallholders 
constitute part of the firms orders destined for the less discerning market segment of overseas customers (Jaffee, 
2003). With the entry of GlobalGAP standard and the framework for incorporation of smallholders, B2B 
relations could increase and become critical governance mechanisms in the horticultural subsector in Kenya. 
Though successful partnership in B2B relations require mutual dependence (Vorley and Fox, 2004), this 
phenomenon has however received little empirical attention. To bridge this gap, this paper answers three critical 
questions on B2B relations between smallholders and exporters; 1) what incentives do Kenyan smallholders 
enjoy under ‘arms-length’ arrangements and what transaction cost reducing factors do buyers consider? 2) Is 
social capital relevant in farm level B2B relations and 3) is there a trade-off between incentives and transaction 
costs? Our aim is to evaluate the determinants underlying contract duration when balancing the need to 
incentivize farmers and reduce transaction costs. The paper contributes to theoretical literature by showing that 
the initial stages of contracting involve exploiting social capital and avoidance of farm level competition for 
supplies. In the latter stages of contracting when B2B relations are stabilized, exchanges are shaped by strong 
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incentives, transaction cost reduction and social capital.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the theoretical model is specified and the 
empirical model and data set presented in section 3. The results and discussions are contained in section 4 and 
section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical model   
Contract theorists (agency and transaction cost) generally associate contracting decisions with risk transfer 
(Stiglitz, 1974), transaction cost economization (Williamson, 1979) and incentive alignment (Hart and 
Holmstrom, 1987). Empirical literature on contracting establishes the relationship between specificity of 
investments and the decision to contract or the duration of contracting (Joskow, 1987). The literature also offers 
broad support for the proposition that transacting parties choose contract terms to promote efficient adaptation 
and mitigate transaction costs (Crocker and Masten, 1988). There is also the notion that incentive considerations 
influence sharing arrangements (Lafontaine, 1992). Hart and Holmström (1987) argue that to generate testable 
implications for contract duration from the deductive agency theory there is need to step outside the theory’s 
propositions and invoke transaction costs. Lyons, (1996) contends that agency theory follows an inclusive use of 
the term contract to encompass any transaction. According to Masten and Saussier, (2002), variables of interest 
in the agency and transaction cost theories overlap. In our model, we acknowledge these insights and model 
duration from a transaction cost perspective (Bercovitz, 1999).  
Primarily, a buyer seeks an economical source of consistent, reliable, quality and safe supplies by 
engaging a producer in an exchange relationship. On one hand, the buyer benefits from access to land
1
 for 
cultivation, all season export supplies and reduced costs of search for potential producers and repeated 
bargaining. However, the buyer is exposed to costs of transacting with numerous sparsely located farmers (e.g., 
transport, assembly, organization, monitoring and incentives etc). On the other hand, smallholders seek to bridge 
their productive resource-poverty through credit and training, access export markets and enhance certainty of 
farm incomes. Conversely, smallholders face the opportunity cost of not selling to the spot market even when 
prices are higher than contract prices, requirement to invest (e.g., water pump, knapsacks and grading shed etc) 
and limited production decisions i.e., farming what the buyer prefers.  
Assuming risk-neutrality, the buyer chooses exchange duration based on incentives and arising 
transaction costs in order to maximize utility i.e. quality supplies. Here, we consider a buyer’s concessions to 
include provision of credit, extension services, and prior information on prices while obligations involve all 
season procurement and arrangement for produce collection and assembly. The buyer is assumed to operate a 
portfolio of incentives in a way that balances the extreme necessity to insure smallholders and the objective to 
access quality supplies. For instance, at the initial stages of an exchange relationship, sellers could be strictly 
chosen and provided with credit. In latter stages, because of repeated transactions and built-in trust, prior 
information on prices might be introduced. Thus, the buyer systematically combines incentives and transaction 
costs minimization depending on the stage of exchange relationship.  
Consequently, the contract duration decision is modeled as a series of discrete choices. For each future 
period, a buyer decides whether or not to govern exchange by contract. Following Masten and Saussier (2002), 
this is represented as a continuous analog to the discrete choice decision. The absence of a contract under this 
formulation corresponds to the limiting case of contract duration equal to zero. Mathematically (see Masten et al. 
1991 for details), the optimal contract duration, , is represented as: 
 (1) 
where  and  and  
For values of contract duration   strictly between 0 and the potential duration of the relationship 
                                                           
1  Land is under National Irrigation Board (NIB), which allocates farmers 1.62 ha for rice production under Irrigation 
Settlement Schemes’ tenancy and 0.41 ha for food crop production. A tenant loses right to land if they cannot fulfil rice 
production obligations including delivering rice to the board (Nguyo et al. 2002). 
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between a smallholder and exporter, ,  elements of  that increase the value of contracting for another period 
more than the forgone benefits of transacting without a contract in that period , results in contracts 
of longer predicted duration. We assume full information and one-time fixed-term supply contracts
1
. 
Since the gist of contract duration model is basically identifying the attributes likely to affect the 
efficiency of contracting and its alternatives and in predicting the direction of their net effects (Masten and 
Saussier (2002), equation [1] could be analyzed using the standard regression model save for several limitations. 
First, most contract durations have a natural lower bound of zero that tends to affect how the distribution of the 
error term is parameterized. Secondly, there is a likelihood of the unobserved and observed variables being 
correlated which renders OLS estimates biased (Maddala, 1999). However, econometrically the problem of data 
censoring is accounted for through maximum likelihood techniques (Crocker and Masten, 1988). 
 
3. Specification of the empirical model    
Following Monteverde and Teece (1982), we econometrically fit various attributes likely to affect the efficiency 
of the duration of B2B relations into equation (1) using OLS and Logistic estimation techniques and then 
estimate predictions of the direction of their net effects. As suggested in Crocker and Masten (1988), the duration 
of contract is modeled in multinomial form to capture breaks in contract periods because farmers have varying 
number of seasons with the same buyer. Assuming there are  unordered multiple choices ( ) and the  
disturbances are independent and identically distributed with Weibull distribution, , the 
econometric specification of the multinomial model would follow as in Greene (2000): 
and  (2) 
where for the  individual, is the observed outcome, is a vector of explanatory variables and are the 
unknown parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood approach. The specific model for empirical 
estimation is thus: 
 (3) 
where  indexes duration, and  is an error term., is the number of seasons with the same 
buyer in the OLS model but is a dummy in the multinomial logit defined as 0 for farmers with up to 4 seasons, 1 
for those with between 5 and 9 seasons and 2 for those with between 10 and 20 seasons. The variables capturing 
incentives, transaction cost reducing factors and social capital are defined in table 1. The choice of the 
multinomial approach is due to the multimodal distribution of the duration variable (median= 5, mean= 4.6 and 
skewness= 1.05) and the presence of 78 farmers with zero contract duration with the buyer. To measure and 
obtain consistent and certain estimates about the relationship between contract duration and explanatory 
variables in the logistic model observed information matrix procedure is used. 
To make the model operational, we propose several assumptions. It is assumed that farmers (buyers) 
have not switched buyers (farmers) during their exchange relations over the seasons before the survey date. On 
their part, buyers provide credit, extension services, prior information on prices and consistent buying of farm 
produce during the season as incentives. This proposition allows buyers to control duration by varying the 
incentive structure. Conversely, sellers create mutual dependability by exploiting their transaction cost reducing 
abilities such as farm sizes, investment in irrigation technology, experience in vegetable farming and in other 
contractual relationships to produce beans. Buyers also contribute toward cost minimization through selection of 
farmers and linking smallholders directly to the markets. Further, social and economic networks consisting of 
                                                           
1 We assume that export firms prefer the relay production system to meet the all-year round export requirements. Under relay 
production, one year may have 2-3 seasons for most vegetables especially French beans (Minot and Ngigi, 2004). 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.22, 2014 
 
26 
number of farmer neighbors, farmers selling to the same buyer, producer groups and French beans buyers in the 
village enhance cooperative enforcement of exchange relations. To control for infrastructural and institutional 
differences, distances from the farm to the produce collection centre, village and source of irrigation water, use 
of supply contracts and membership to producer groups and locality of farms are used. The interaction of 
incentives, transaction cost reducing factors and social/economic networks is hypothesized to yield durations of 
varying degrees i.e. short (up to 4 seasons), medium (5 to 9 seasons) and long (10-20 seasons). For instance, 
because of moral hazard and adverse selection problems, short durations may entail selection of new entrants and 
use of farmer neighbors. In the medium duration, extension could be emphasized to impart production 
knowledge and a supply contract offered to control farm outputs. Long durations might demand organizational 
capabilities such as organized marketing around farmers that sell to same buyer for supply consistency and 
reliability. 
 
3.1 Data requirements   
The data come from a survey of French beans smallholders of Mwea Tebere of Kirinyaga in Central Kenya. The 
study site is an irrigated rice scheme set up on around 36 villages where farmers produce rice under tenancy from 
National Irrigation Board. Export horticulture is produced on farms set aside for other agricultural activities 
through market reciprocity agreements between farmers and exporters. There is a network of handling facilities 
owned privately or by the Horticultural Crop Development Authority and farms are served by all-weather gravel 
compacted roads. Irrigation water is pumped from NIB water canals for a fee charged by a water users 
association or from the main rivers-Nyamindi, Murubara and Thiba on farms ranging from 0.25-3 acres. There 
are local collection centres spread all over the producing villages where buyers and sellers assemble farm 
produce for sorting and grading. During the 2006 crop season, a random sample of 249 farmers was selected 
from among 24 of 36 farm villages in the region conditional on a French beans crop and a short structured 
questionnaire administered on a face to face interview. The main research questions were on the number of 
seasons a farmer sold beans to the current buyer before the survey, access to credit and extension from the buyer, 
the farm production structure, marketing characteristics, social capital and infrastructural factors. Table 1 
presents the whole sample data on the variables included in the model.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the OLS and Multinomial Logit estimations (N=249) 
Variable Defined as Mean  Std. Dev  Min Max 
Dur Contract duration (seasons) 4.64 4.42 0 20 
Incentives  
Credit Credit access (1, 0) .81 .39 0 1 
Exten Number of extension visits (days) 4.84 4.99 0 15 
Ptim Prior information on price (1, 0) .32 .47 0 1 
Bysn Buys beans all season (1, 0) .69 .46 0 1 
Transaction cost reducing factors 
Land Farm area under beans(acre) 1.01 .70 .25 3 
Exprc Vegetable farming experience (yrs) 13.05 7.17 1 31 
Pump Invested in water pump (1, 0) .90 .31 0 1 
Rice Rice grower (1, 0) .68 .47 0 1 
Bloct Farmer selected (1, 0) .29 .45 0 1 
Firm Directly linked by exporter (1, 0) .51 .50 0 1 
Social capital/networks in the village 
Fneib Number of farmer neighbours 4.69 2.45 0 20 
Fmbuy Number selling to the same buyer 3.48 1.58 0 6 
Group  Group membership (1,0) .40 .49 0 1 
Grup Number of producer groups 2.64 .1.99 0 5 
Buys Number of buyers  8.94 2.60 2 12 
Control variables 
Ofdis Distance (farm to collection centre (m)) 868.94 881.61 0 3000 
Fvdis Distance (farm to village (m)) 872.09 542.65 100 3000 
Fwdis Distance (farm to irrigation water (m)) 283.13 208.11 100 1000 
Contr Uses supply contract (1, 0) .32 .47 0 1 
Loct Located in Upper Mwea (1, 0) .34 .48 0 1 
Source: French beans survey, Mwea Tebere April-June 2006 
 
On average a farmer had 4.6 seasons with the same buyer. This is approximately one and a quarter year 
when production planning is on a relay system as argued in Minot and Ngigi (2004). Eighty one per cent of the 
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farmers received credit during the season. Credit is costly and not available to all resource poor producers and 
traders in Kenya but where available, most farmers do not risk indebtedness for fear of bankruptcy. Fafchamps 
(2000) argues that access to credit by producers in rural economies is constrained by high interest rates for 
instance. Obare and Kariuki (2003) found that the form of credit provided for Mwea horticultural producers is 
mainly an advance to offset harvesting costs and hence non-productive capital. This is replicated in many Micro-
Finance Institutions (MFIs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) trying to reach the marginalised credit seekers (see Pederson and Kiiru, 1996). The 
average distances between the farm and the collection centre, village and source of irrigation water were around 
869, 872 and 283 metres respectively. This shows close proximity to collection centres, villages and 
encroachment of waterways in order to reduce either post-harvest losses, assembly and irrigation costs.  
The area under French beans was 1.01 acres. The average farm size compares with the national 
averages of 1.0 acre for small horticultural farms (International Centre for Insect Physiology and Entomology 
(ICIPE), 2003; Minot and Ngigi, 2004). Ninety per cent of the farmers had a water pump and pipes for irrigation 
purposes. Imperatively, some farmers did not own any irrigation equipment. Hiring of equipment (e.g., water 
pump, water pipes and a knapsack sprayer ect) in exchange for labour is a common practice in the study area 
especially for part-time farmers and those fully engaged in rice farming (Obare and Kariuki, 2003). Some farms 
are also located on medium slopes relative to water canals which suits flood irrigation (Muiruri and Nyoro, 
1999). 
The average number of extension visits during the season was approximately 5 days. Considering the 
French beans production cycle of 65 days, this characterizes minimal extension services in rural Kenya. The 
provision of extension services is mainly from the private sector (e.g.,Non-Governmental Organizations) 
research bodies (e.g., International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology) and the public sector (e.g. Kenya 
Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS), Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) and 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) etc). A buyer may engage own field crop officers to monitor crop production on 
particular farms that are contracted or targeted as potential supply points. In addition, government or NGO 
controlled extension officers may visit growing regions to offer advice on pests, chemicals and other agronomic 
practices. Garforth (2005) notes that duplication of extension services between private and public providers 
frequently results to uncoordinated human, physical and financial resources. Further, the extension service 
framework is not demand-driven, and lacks an influential farmer voice in decisions on provision, management 
and monitoring of services (ibid). This dilutes the potential impact of extension services. Provision of extension 
services to smallholders has elsewhere been termed costly by horticultural exporters (see Jaffee, 2003 and 
McCulloch and Ota, 2002).  
The data reveals that the average experience in vegetable production was 13 years. This shows that 
most farmers were involved in horticulture farming since the early 1990s when maximum residue levels, farm 
audits and influence of supermarkets started exerting pressure on exporters to observe produce quality and safety 
(see Barrett et al. 1999 and Asfaw et al. 2010). The data also show that 68% of the farmers were rice growers, 
32% had a supply contract, 29% were selected by the buyer, 40% were members of a producer group, 32% 
received information on prices at the beginning of the season, 69% sold to the same buyer during the season, and 
34% farmed in Upper Mwea. Rice production is the principal occupation in the study area especially in the lower 
region (Nguyo et al. 2002). Due to the increasing strict food quality and safety standards, it is common for 
buyers to select sellers based on how well they can observe the set requirements and to use market reciprocity 
contracts (Jaffee, 2003; Kariuki and Obare, 2004). It is also likely to find new farm organisation at the 
smallholder level with producer groups slowly replacing individual farm production (Natural Resources Institute, 
2002). Incentives in form of farm inputs dominate smallholders’ buyer-supplier exchange relationships (Dijkstra 
et al. 2001), but prior information on prices could motivate future production in smallholdings. Further, 
competition for supplies and strategies to overcome opportunism in French beans marketing generate varied 
procurement models with some sellers opting to sell to various buyers and others sticking to the same buyers all 
season (Ouma, 2010). There were on average 2.6 producer groups, 4.7 farmer neighbours, 3.5 farmers selling to 
the same buyer and 8.9 buyers known to the farmer in the village. The number of people one can depend on and 
traders known within the village has a bearing on contract duration. The more the number, the wider the social 
networks for sharing market and quality information and stronger the ties to enforce contractual requirements.  
Table 2 presents the disaggregated data based on contract duration. The table shows that 100, 108 and 
41 farmers had short, medium and long duration respectively. The data shows that farmers with short duration 
farmed significantly further from the village, and also more grew rice and got selected to farm beans than those 
with medium duration. They also knew more farmer neighbours. There is a high likelihood that initial stages of 
contracting focus on farmers with prior contractual experience, social networks and positive farming attributes. 
There were significantly more farmers that accessed credit, got directly linked to the market by an exporter, 
owned a water pump and used a supply contract, belonged to a producer group, had prior information on prices 
and whose produce was bought all the season in the medium than in the short duration. The farms in the medium 
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duration were also significantly further from the collection centre, farmers had more extension visits and they 
knew more buyers in the village and farmers selling to the same buyer than in the short duration. In the transition 
stage, there seems to be emphasis on use of incentives, organization capability, networks and reputation to 
solidify relationships than in the initial stages of contracting. In the medium duration, there were significantly 
more farmers linked to the markets by exporters and had significantly invested in water pumps, had significantly 
more extension visits, knew more buyers in the village and farmer neighbours than those in the long duration. 
This shows that it is more likely to use incentives, demand investment in irrigation technology and rely on social 
capital in the transitory than in the latter stages of contracting. In the long duration, farmers had significantly 
more land under beans, and their farms were further from the village and source of irrigation water, significantly 
more farmers grew rice, used supply contracts, got selected to farm beans, belonged to producer groups and 
received prior information on prices than in the medium duration. This suggests that it is more likely to factor on 
scale economies, supply control and organizational capability in the long duration. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics conditional on duration of contract 
 
NB: *, ** and *** mean significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level (asterisk on the mean compares 0 and 1 and on SD 
compares 1 and 2). 
Source: Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 2006 
Interestingly, buyers procured supplies from the same seller all the season in the medium and long 
durations which indicates a high likelihood of loyalty in the supply and procurement of farm produce. Uniquely, 
there were significantly more farmers that were directly linked to the markets by exporters, owned a water pump 
and, had farms in Upper Mwea in the medium than in the short and long durations. Additionally, they knew 
more buyers in the village and had more number of extension visits than farmers in the short and long durations. 
The findings indicate a high likelihood of transaction cost reduction, social capital and incentives use in the 
 
Variable 
description Short duration=0 (0-4 seasons) (N=100)  Medium duration=1 (5-9 seasons) (N=108)  Long duration=2 (10-20 seasons) (N=41)  
Variable Defined as Mean S.D Min Max Mean S. D Min Max Mean S. D Min Max 
Incentives  
Credit Credit access (1, 
0) 
.62 .49 0 1 .93*** .26 0 1 .98 .16 0 1 
Exten Number of 
extension visits 
(days) 
.54 1.81 0 10 8.3*** 4.27** 0 15 6.24 4.15 0 15 
Ptim Prior 
information on 
price (1, 0) 
.03 .17 0 1 .39*** .49 0 1 .85 .36*** 0 1 
Bysn Buys beans all 
season (1, 0) 
.24 .43 0 1 1*** 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Transaction costs reducing factors 
Land Farm area under 
beans(acre) 




13.22 6.88 2 31 13.2 8.07 1 28 12.22 5.19 1 27 
Pump Invested in 
water pump (1, 
0) 
.83 .38 0 1 .96** .19* 0 1 .88 .33 0 1 
Rice Rice grower (1, 
0) 
.78*** .42 0 1 .52 .5 0 1 .85 .36*** 0 1 
Bloct Farmer selected 
(1, 0) 
.42*** .50 0 1 .07 .26 0 1 .51 .51*** 0 1 
Firm Directly linked 
by exporter (1, 
0) 
.12 .33 0 1 .86*** .35*** 0 1 .56 .5 0 1 
Social capital\networks in the village 
Fneib Number of 
farmer 
neighbours 
5.23*** 3.29 0 20 4.47 1.68* 1 10 3.98 1.19 2 6 
Fmbuy Number selling 
to the same 
buyer 
2.99 1.94 0 6 3.85*** 1.18 0 6 3.71 1.17 2 6 
Group  Group 
membership 
(1,0) 
.04 .20 0 1 .56*** .50 0 1 .85 .36*** 0 1 
Grup Number of 
producer groups 
2.83 2.09 0 5 2.51 1.7 0 5 2.51 2.43 0 5 
Buys Number of 
buyers  
8.09 3.08 2 12 9.77*** 1.86** 4 12 8.83 2.32 2 12 
Control variables 
Ofdis Distance (farm 
to collection 
centre (m)) 
577.45 464.06 0 2000 996.48*** 1144.25 0 3000 1243.9 618.89 100 3000 
Fvdis Distance (farm 
to village (m)) 
969** 477.94 100 3000 733.8 577.9 100 3000 1000 524.52** 100 3000 
Fwdis Distance (farm 
to irrigation 
water (m)) 
276.1 186.44 100 1000 255.46 205.16 100 1000 373.17 243.70** 100 1000 
Contr Uses supply 
contract (1, 0) 
.05 .22 0 1 .35*** .48 0 1 .88 .33*** 0 1 
Loct Located in 
Upper Mwea (1, 
0) 
.17 .38 0 1 .61*** .49*** 0 1 .05 .22 0 1 
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transitory stage. The data also shows that farmers were significantly further from the village and more produced 
rice and were selected to produce beans in the short and long than in the medium duration. This suggests 
avoidance of competition for supplies and control of supplies in the initial and latter stages of contracting. 
Another finding is that there were significantly more farmers that used supply contracts, belonged to producer 
groups and had prior information on prices in the medium and long than in the short duration. This finding might 
indicate that supply control, organizational capability and incentives are stronger in the transitory and latter 
stages of contracting. Further, farmers knew significantly more farmer neighbours in the short and medium than 
in the long duration which shows that social networks could favour initial and transitory stages of contracting.  
 
4. Results and discussions  
The OLS estimates have been computed using a robust estimator and reported in table 3.  
 Table 3: OLS and multinomial Logit estimates 
 OLS Estimates Multinomial Logit Esimates 
 Dependent variable, seasons Short duration=0, (0-4 seasons) N=100 Long duration=2 (10-20 seasons) N=41 
Independent variables Coef. S. E. t Coef. S.E. AME S. E. Coef. S.E. AME S. E. 
Incentives 
Credit_1 1.086 .633 1.72* -.223 .735 -.060 .053 5.700 3.860 .097* .059 
Exten -.105 .064 -1.64 -.232* .121 -.016** .008 .138 .353 .004 .006 
Ptim_1 2.873 .573 5.01*** -.014 1.180 -.141* .086 17.491** 7.612 .293*** .100 
Transaction costs reducing factors 
Land 1.322 .316 4.19*** .637 .464 .008 .033 4.169* 2.185 .065** .031 
Exprc -.392 .296 -1.32 -.086 .412 -.005 .029 -.026 1.607 .000 .027 
Pump_1 -1.233 .756 -1.63 -.769 .926 .018 .058 -8.544** 3.543 -.137*** .046 
Rice_1 .150 .422 0.35 .897 .633 -.009 .049 8.369** 3.698 .133*** .050 
Bloct_1 .231 .656 0.35 1.556** .666 .014 .054 10.873** 4.516 .170*** .061 
Firm_1 1.060 .723 1.47 -.911 1.005 -.001 .065 -7.322** 3.294 -.116** .045 
Social capital\networks in the village 
Fneib -.113 .064 -1.77* .282* .171 .042*** .013 -2.920** 1.149 -.051*** .013 
Fmbuy .610 .155 3.93*** -.597*** .197 -.068*** .014 3.620** 1.492 .065*** .018 
Grup -.099 .174 -0.57 .327* .183 .015 .012 .814* .484 .011 .007 
Buys .967 .789 1.23 -2.026** .897 -.114** .055 -2.182 1.622 -.020 .025 
Control variables 
Ofdis .001 .000 5.27*** -.001** .001 -.000*** .000 .004* .002 .000** .000 
Fvdis -.098 .248 -0.39 .471 .346 .059** .025 -3.596** 1.783 -.064*** .024 
Fwdis .342 .324 1.05 .083 .430 -.031 .032 4.533** 2.057 .075** .030 
Contr_1 3.10 .673 4.61*** -2.107** 1.013 -.163*** .061 3.245 2.152 .071** .031 
Loct_1 -1.134 .467 -2.43** -.200 .773 .012 .051 -3.141 2.217 -.051 .035 
Constant -1.220 3.342 -0.37 3.378 3.947   -22.619 15.710   
NB: Base cases (medium duration=2: all binary variables=0): F ( 18,   230)=24.62 (p-value = 0.0000), R
2 
= 




 show that approximately 62% of the total variation in the duration of contract is attributable to 
the explanatory variables at between 1 and 10% levels. The model’s F statistic, F (18, 230) = 24.62, is also 
significant at 1% level. The variation and the F-test indicate that the OLS model is relatively strong and shows 
good fit. Maddala, (1983) and Menard, (2002) argue that OLS estimates may be biased due to the interval nature 
of contract duration and zero periods. Hence the results may only be mentioned but not prominently discussed. 
For instance, the duration of contract increases by 1.322 seasons for an additional acre of land area under beans 
and farmers with a supply contract have 3.1 more seasons than those without a supply contract.     
Multinomial logistic estimates have been estimated using the observed information matrix and are 
reported in table 3. The variables representing membership to a producer group and buying all the season have 
been dropped due to perfect prediction of medium and long durations. The model’s LR chi2(36) of 384.34 is 
significant and the estimates show that a considerable number of the incentives, transaction cost reduction and 
social capital variables are significant at between 1% and10% levels. The interpretation of the results is based on 
the average marginal effects (AME) which allow use of actual probabilities in the discussions (see Wooldridge, 
2010). On incentives, the results show that the probability of a short duration is on average about 1.6% and 
14.1% lower for those with a higher number of extension visits and those with prior information on prices during 
the season respectively, ceteris paribus. And on social capital, the probability of a short duration is on average 
4.2% higher for farmers who know more farmer neighbours but is on average 6.8% lower for farmers who know 
more farmers that sell to the same buyer and 11.4% lower the more the number of buyers in the village. The 
control variables show that the probability of a short duration is 16.3% lower for farmers with a supply contract 
compared with those without a supply contract but higher by 5.9% for farmers with farms further from the 
village. The results suggest that in the initial stages farmer neighbours are the prime movers of short duration 
contracts. This is more important especially if a farm is located further from the village. Rationally, a higher 
number of farmer neighbours generates the critical mass for contracting as well as a cost-effective foundation for 
shared information and knowledge. There is less emphasis on incentives perhaps due to lack of trust given that 
crop delivery may not be guaranteed at harvest because of competition between farmers to supply produce and 
between buyers for crop deliveries. This could be more succinct if there are a higher number of farmers selling to 
the same buyer and the number of buyers in the village and if farmers use supply contracts since there is also 
lower probability of short duration contracts. The result suggests that contracting smallholders is beset with pre-
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contractual enforcement problems of intra and extra-competition that make it difficult to use incentives. These 
difficulties in turn favour dependence on social networks to initiate contracts. Generally, the results show that 
compared with medium duration, short durations are heavily dependent on social capital which is strengthened 
by locality of farms away from the village. This result seems plausible because buyers need to know farmers 
before engaging them in business to farm business relationships. Additionally, supplies from farms near villages 
would most likely attract intense competition which would in turn disadvantage new entrants in fresh produce 
contracting. Consequently, there seems to be a balance between avoidance of competition and exposure to 
transportation costs in the short duration. 
The probability of long duration is on average 9.7% higher for farmers with access to credit and 29.3% 
higher if farmers have prior information on prices during the season. This result indicates that after contracting 
has stabilized, incentives become the pillar of tying farmers in repeated exchanges. However, the probability of a 
long duration is on average 13.7% lower for farmers who own a water pump and 11.6% for those directly linked 
to the markets by exporters but is on average 6.5% higher for farmers with large farm sizes, 13.3% higher for 
those who grow rice and 17% higher for those selected by the buyer to grow beans. This result further shows that 
minimization of transaction costs through economies of scale, contractual experience and farmers’ ability to 
meet quality requirements are a key element in latter stages of contracting. Additionally, the probability of a long 
duration is 5.1% lower for farmers who know more farmer neighbours but 6.5% higher for farmers who know 
more farmers that sell beans to the same buyer. It might be imputed that the value of economic networks is 
stronger in latter stages of contracting because of possibilities of shared market information. The control 
variables reveal that the probability of a long duration is 6.4% lower for farmers who are further from the village 
but 7.5% and 7.1% higher for farmers who are further from the source of irrigation water and those who use a 
supply contract respectively. While a supply contract holds partners into a mutually dependent relationship, 
distances further from irrigation water protect waterways from pollution and environmental degradation from 
farm wastes. Conversely, the low probability of long duration due to ownership of a pump, direct linkage to the 
markets by an exporter and knowledge of a higher number of farmer neighbours suggests that investments in 
irrigation technology, linking farmers to markets and developed village market hubs empowers farmers to make 
flexible choices devoid of longevity. The overall results show that incentives are mainly monetary and 
minimization of transaction costs relies on scale economies, accumulated expertise in contracting and reduction 
of information asymmetry costs in the latter stages of contracting. This is compounded by irrigation and 
contractual enforcement costs. Therefore, in the long duration contracts buyers seek to balance the extreme need 
to incentivize farmers and the reduction of the main transaction costs.  
The results of this study reveal the role of strong incentives in contracting (see Lafontaine and Slade, 
2014 for instance). Incentives are essential in the later stages of an exchange relationship especially when 
transacting with resource poor producers. Thus credit and extension services are critical if the relationship 
involves capital investments and technically demanding export vegetables that are subject to import quality and 
safety requirements. According to Zeller (2000), credit assists the poor to weather economic and climatic shocks 
in the short run and enables them to finance investments in new agricultural and non-agricultural assets. Credit 
would usually be used in the purchase of irrigation equipment e.g. knapsacks and water pumps, among others, 
and construction of grading sheds. Credit could also be used by buyers to ‘lock’ smallholders into repeated 
relations through the highly preferred relay production for year round exports (Jaffee, 2003). Extension services 
provide producers with knowledge on new methods of farming such as traceability, certification schemes and the 
process of certification, market changes on quality and agronomic practices e.g. use and application of pesticides. 
Therefore, provision of credit and extension services  corroborate theoretical basis for contracting as a way of 
motivating a producer to exert more effort and perform as the buyer postulates (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2003) and 
as a commitment and insurance to continued trading (Lafontaine, 1992).  
Our results are also consistent with the transaction cost considerations in exchange relations and 
contract duration (Williamson, 1996). Selection of producers, prior contractual experience and a supply 
arrangement captures the uncertainty embedded in futures markets especially in the fresh quality produce 
markets. Reducing the transaction costs due to information asymmetry may unlock producers’ potential through 
production planning and secure supplies from competitors if the market depends on dynamics of supply and 
demand. Thus, long duration exchange relationships in fresh export crops demand reliability and consistency 
while at the same time keeping financial support and monitoring costs down. This theme runs through the works 
of McCulloch and Ota (2002), Jaffee (2003), Reardon and Farina, (2002) and Graffham et al. (2007). 
In addition, our results support contractual design and economies of scale literature when dealing with 
numerous producers. The land under French beans is a proxy for production potential and the number of farmers 
selling to the same buyer a proxy for organized market hub. Compared to small farm sizes, large ones could 
produce more output due to economies of scale but small farms could be organized into a common unit with 
economies of scale in production, reduced monitoring and administrative costs. In Mahoney (1992), output is a 
measure of a producer’s effort. Output also features in quantity and quality specifications of a product in 
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designing contract terms (Sykuta and Parcell, 2002). In the long duration relationship output and market 
organization gain value indicating buyers’ awareness of the negative marginal benefits from quality as output 
increases. Smallholders may be unable to adequately observe quality standards when faced with large outputs 
due to lack of crop handling facilities or sheer knowledge of post-harvest handling practices. Lack of expertise is 
emphasized in quality standards protocols (e.g. GlobalGAP, 2009) while, Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) (1999) cites technical quality challenges as a major constraint to smallholders’ entry into lucrative export 
markets. Large outputs may also increase transaction costs in terms of quality control, grading, and assembly 
facilities, and human capital as observed in Joskow (1987) and Bercovitz (1999). 
 
5. Conclusions and implications  
Despite significant growth in Kenya’s horticultural exports, farm consolidations, rise of supermarkets, private 
standards, and public and government concerns for food safety are increasingly reshaping engagement of 
smallholders. This dynamism lead to particular agency and transactions cost problems in business to farm 
business procurement relationships between exporters and smallholders. This paper answers the question on 
duration of farm level exchange relationships conditional on incentives, minimization of transaction costs and 
social capital.   
Multinomial logistic estimates showed that a higher number of farmer neighbours and distance from the 
village significantly influenced the probability of short duration. It is concluded that short durations are 
dependent on social capital irrespective of transportation costs. Therefore, entry in business to farm business 
exchanges in smallholdings should exploit farmer networks while avoiding farms around villages since they are 
centres of intense competition for supplies. Conversely, access to credit and prior information on prices, farm 
area under beans, contractual experience and selection of farmers, a higher number of farmers selling to the same 
buyer, use of a supply contract and distance from the source of irrigation water showed higher probability of 
long duration. The conclusion is that long duration exchanges are based on high powered incentives, transaction 
cost reduction, social capital and control of quality supplies. Consequently, stabilizing farm level business to 
business relationships in smallholdings will require a balance between the need to incentivize future production 
and to reduce important transaction costs while exploiting social networks. The results imply that for any 
production and market intervention programs to succeed in the smallholder sector, buyers need to exploit social 
networks, use production and output incentives and build on existing farmer expertise. 
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